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Abstract
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) sharply increased over the last two 
decades. It is often pointed out that cross-border capital reallocation is partly the result 
of financial liberalization policies, government policies and regional agreements. In 
this paper, we identify some of the main forces driving cross-border M&As using a 
unique database on bilateral cross-border M&As at the sectoral level (in manufacturing 
and services) over the period 1985-2004. We focus on the role of institutional and 
financial developments with a special attention to the role played by the European 
Integration process. We identify the impact of (i) joining the European Union and (ii) 
joining the Euro on cross-border M&As. We show that EU and EMU have almost 
doubled M&As in manufacturing towards their members from all over the globe, with 
an additional 50% increase within EMU countries. Conversely, the service sector did 
not exploit the opportunity offered by the single currency. We also show how cross-
border M&As are linked to the acquirer expected profitability and provide insights on 
the effectiveness of policies to attract foreign capital (such as corporate tax incentives, 
and interventions to improve the country's financial system and product market 
regulations).
Keywords: Cross Mergers and Acquisitions, Gravity Equation, Euro. 
JEL Classification: F30, F36, F41, G11. 5
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Non-technical summary 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions activities (M&As) sharply increased over the 
last two decades, partly as result of financial liberalization policies, government 
policies and regional agreements.  
Capital reallocation across firms occurs either through the sale of property, plant and 
equipment or through M&As, in which the transfer of financial claims from the 
acquiring firm brings along that of the underlying assets of the targeted firm. In the 
case of cross-border M&As, the main activity of the acquirer and target firms are 
registered in two different countries. Various motives for M&As can be distinguished 
in general. In the industrial organization literature two basic motives stand out: an 
efficiency motive and a strategic motive. Efficiency gains arise because takeovers 
increase economies of scale or scope. Strategic gains arise if M&As change the 
market structure and thus a company’s competitive position and profit level. The main 
problems with these explanations is that they cannot explain why cross-border M&As 
move for example in waves together with developments in stock markets. Moreover, 
cross-border mergers are related to economy-wide shocks, such as the European 
economic integration. 
In this paper, we identify some of the main forces driving M&As, using a unique 
database on bilateral cross-border M&As at the sectoral level (in manufacturing and 
services) over the period 1985-2004. The key empirical findings are: (1) EMU helped 
the restructuring of capital within the same sector of manufacturing activity among 
euro area firms; (2) joining the EU favoured both horizontal and vertical mergers; (3) 
policymakers can help attract capital by reducing the corporate tax rates and the 
degree of product market regulations and by improving the country’s financial 
systems. Specifically, over the average period 1999-2004, EMU increased intra-euro 
area cross-border horizontal M&As activity in manufacturing by 200%. The estimated 
effect on euro area M&As from non-euro to euro area countries amounts to a 70% 
increase. The impact of the euro on vertical mergers in manufacturing sectors from 
non-euro to euro area countries is also important (about 140%). We also found that 
the service industry has not yet fully benefited from European integration. Existing 
barriers to trade in services could have undermined M&As decisions of entrepreneurs 
in the services industry. Indeed, we show that the level of protection and barriers to 
entry in the services sector act as a strong deterrent to cross-border M&As in services 
across countries. 6
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1018
March 2009
We also find that profitability is a key driver of M&As, as the acquiring sector’s stock 
market capitalization is an important explanatory variable of cross-border M&As 
within the same sector as well as across sectors for both firm type in manufacturing 
and services. Q theory suggests that if the market value of a firm over its book value 
is greater than one - implying the existence of “intangibles” such as brands, reputation 
and knowledge or growth potential that business analysts and shareholders value - 
then the firm should increase its capital stock as investing is profitable. The empirical 
results of this paper provide support to the Tobin’s q prediction, and this result can 
explain also why cross-border M&As come in waves. 
Finally, we obtain interesting results on the role of corporate taxation, which are 
informative for government policies. A 10 percentage point decrease in the 
differential in effective average corporate taxes between target and acquiring 
countries would increase the outflows of manufacturing equity investment in the same 
sector by 68%. This large effect suggests that changes in corporate taxes are an 
efficient tool to attract foreign capital and raise the question of the coordination of 
fiscal policies in Europe.7
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1 Introduction
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have long been an important strategy to expand
abroad. Due to technological developments and globalization, M&As activity sharply increased over
the last two decades. They skyrocketed in the 1990s reaching a pick in 2000 with the booming stock
markets and the larger degree of ﬁnancial liberalization worldwide, declined sharply in 2001 and 2002
and rebounded again with new developments in the world economy after 2003 (see Figures 1 to 3
in the appendix, section 7.1).1 Traditionally, developed countries, and in particular the developed
countries of the European Union (EU15) and the United States, have been the largest acquirer and
target countries of M&As. Over the 2003-2005 period, developed countries accounted for 85% of the
USD 465 billion cross-border M&As, 47% and 23% of which respectively pertain EU15 and US ﬁrms
either as acquirer or as target countries (UNCTAD (2006)).
Despite this increased importance of cross-border M&As, which constitute by far the largest share
of foreign direct investment, the determinants underlying such activities remain unclear.2 The only
empirical papers - we are aware of - are Di Giovanni (2005) and Head and Ries (2007), who using
respectively Tobit and the Poisson maximum likelihood method, ﬁnd cultural and geographical prox-
imity to be important determinants of aggregate MAs; Berger at al. (2004) who using Tobit look at
determinants of cross-border transaction values in the ﬁnancial sector; while Goerg et al (2006) and
Focarelli and Pozzolo (2008) focus on the number of cross-border deals using the negative binomial
regression model, respectively for M&As in manufacturing sectors and those in banking and insurance.
In this paper, we focus on the role of institutional and ﬁnancial developments on cross-border
M&As related to manufacturing and service sectors with a special attention to the role played by
European integration using Poisson maximum likelihood method. The institutional environment is of
a particular interest for cross-border M&As since they are aﬀected by various regulations at the country
level (or regional level) such as competition policy, corporate and capital taxes, various restrictions to
capital movements across borders, protection of certain industries.
From that perspective, the Single European Market in 1992 and the Third Stage of Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 constitute important experiments to evaluate the impact of
regional agreements on capital reallocation. In the paper, we jointly investigate the impact on cross-
border M&As of joining the European Union (EU eﬀect), whose single market formally removes
1Capital reallocation across ﬁrms occurs either through the sale of property, plant and equipment or through M&As,
in which the transfer of ﬁnancial claims from the acquiring ﬁrm brings along that of the underlying assets of the targeted
ﬁrm. In the case of cross-border M&As, the main activity of the acquirer and target ﬁrms are registered in two diﬀerent
countries.
2A review of the literature in management science can be found in Shimizu et al (2004).8
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the remaining barriers to free movements of capital, labour, goods and services within the European
Economic Community;3 and the impact of adopting the euro (EMU eﬀect), whose introduction should
have facilitated the movement of capital by boosting ﬁnancial integration in the euro area, through
the reduction of the cost of capital, the elimination of exchange rate risk, the sharing of common
trading platforms (e.g. the creation of Euronext through the cross-border merger of the Amsterdam,
Brussels, Lisbon and Paris exchanges) and integration in post-trading market infrastructure.
While the impact of the EMU on trade in goods and portfolio ﬂows has attracted a great deal
of attention from policy makers and scholars,4 such analysis has not been performed for capital re-
allocation through cross-border M&As.5 Has EU/EMU fostered capital reallocation through M&As
across their member states? Has EU/EMU increased their capacity to attract capital from the rest of
the world? These are crucial questions for potential entrants who would like to assess the beneﬁts of
joining EU/EMU.
Besides the role played by EU or EMU membership, understanding more broadly the determi-
nants of capital reallocation across countries is key for policymakers, as most countries try to provide
incentives to attract FDI without a clear evaluation of their policies.
Literature classiﬁes the various motives to merge in the following main groups (see e.g. Perry and
Porter (1985), Andrade et al. (2001), Nocke and Yeaple (2007), Long et al. (2007)):6 1) high-Tobin’s
q ﬁrms are those with the best technology and seek to expand their capital stock7; 2) eﬃciency
gains arise because takeovers increase economies of scale or scope or other synergies, such as tax
considerations or acquisition of funds; 3) strategic gains arise if M&As change the market structure
and thus a company’s competitive position and proﬁt level by forming monopolies or oligopolies; 4)
3Neary (2007) shows that trade liberalization can trigger cross-border merger waves.
4Examples of the former are Rose (2000), Micco, Stein and Ordonez (2003), Flam and Nordstrom (2003), Baldwin
and Taglioni (2006), Baldwin (2006); examples of the latter are Lane (2006), Coeurdacier and Martin (2006), De Santis
and Gerard (2006).
5The closest paper to our work is Petroulas (2007), who estimated the impact of the introduction of the euro on
inward FDI ﬂows and ﬁnds that the EMU increased FDI ﬂows by approximately 15% within the euro area. See also De
Sousa and Lochard (2006a, 2006b) and Schiavo (2007) for related work on the impact of EMU on FDI ﬂows. However,
these studies do not control for developments in the stock market and for the general tendency of investing in the euro
area from the rest of the world. As a result, their estimates may be somewhat upward biased.
6See Nocke and Yeaple (2007) and Head and Ries (2007) for additional references on theoretical industrial organization
issues.
7Q theory suggests that if the market value of a ﬁrm over its book value is greater than one - implying the existence
of “intangibles” such as brands, reputation and knowledge or growth potential that business analysts and shareholders
value - then the ﬁrm should increase its capital stock as investing is proﬁtable. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), for
example, show that the q-theory of investment can be used to explain domestic investment via M&As and ﬁnd that
M&As respond to stock market developments by more than direct investment. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2005) used the
Tobin’s q to show that capital reallocation between ﬁrms is procyclical. De Santis et al. (2004) argue that the q-theory
of investment can also translate in higher FDI outﬂows and ﬁnd that a rise in the euro area stock market (a proxy
for euro area Tobin’s q led to an increase in euro area outward FDI to the United States over the period 1980 to 2001.
Similarly, De Santis and Ehling (2007) - looking at the interlinkages between FDI and foreign portfolio investment among
Germany, the other G7 economies and Switzerland over the quarterly period 1980-2006 - ﬁnd that German FDI outﬂows
and inﬂows are both function of Tobin’s q.9
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building empires allow to diversify and hedge against sectoral shocks; 5) managers might be motivated
by managerial compensation or pure ego. It is very diﬃcult to empirically disentangle these diﬀerent
strategic elements. We focus on the value-enhancing motives, which broadly encompass the ﬁrst three
main groups. M&As can help satisfy future goods demand, can reduce costs, might change the market
structure and the market power, thereby aﬀecting future proﬁts captured by the market valuation of
the acquiring ﬁrm. We also attempt to look at the building empire motives by looking at mergers
within a given sector (horizontal) or across diﬀerent sectors (vertical).
We also control for the impact of the quality of institutions in driving cross-border M&As. Sound
institutions and a high degree of governance play an important role in the competitiveness of an econ-
omy as well as a country’s credibility vis-` a-vis international investors. Reliable institutions enhance
transparency, and sound legal and political systems oﬀer a less uncertain environment to investors.
Therefore, countries’ institutions might also aﬀect the reallocation of capital cross-border by reducing
the cost of the capital.8
We also raise the questions of the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal policies and of product market regulations
in attracting foreign capital. One implication of the processes of ﬁnancial globalization and European
integration is that capital is more mobile internationally, which raises concerns regarding the use of tax
and market regulation policies in order to compete across countries. The issue of capital attractiveness
leads to several discussions within the EU on possible tax and market regulation harmonization among
member states. While one could argue that countries with higher corporate taxes and higher degree of
market regulations are less attractive for cross-border M&As, the quantitative impact of these policies
on ﬁrms’ location decisions is essentially an empirical question.
To assess the impact of the main forces driving cross-border M&As, we construct a unique database
for 10 acquiring manufacturing sectors and 10 acquiring service sectors located in 21 diﬀerent countries
targeting foreign assets in 31 diﬀerent host countries (over the 1985-2004 period). Speciﬁcally, an
acquiring manufacturing ﬁrm (sector) can merge with or acquire foreign ﬁrms whose main activity
can be classiﬁed (i) in the same sector of the acquiring ﬁrm (“within mergers”), or (ii) in a diﬀerent
manufacturing sector or service sector (“across mergers”). Similarly, an acquiring service ﬁrm (sector)
can merge with or acquire foreign ﬁrms within the same sector, or whose main activity is either in
manufacturing or in a diﬀerent service sector. We believe that mergers occurred within sectors includes
mostly horizontal mergers while mergers across sectors can be seen as vertical mergers.9
8Alfaro et al. (2007, 2008) ﬁnd institutional quality to be a causal determinant of equity and FDI inﬂows (see also
Wei (2000a, 2000b) for earlier work on these issues). Using FDI stocks in a cross-section analysis, Daude and Fratzcher
(2007) found that institutions do not aﬀect FDI positions.
9We must be cautious with this interpretation since cross-border M&As are aggregated at the 2-digit level and some
mergers within the same sector might be vertical ones.10
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From 1948 to 1994, the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) provided the rules for
much of the world goods trade. Moreover, the OECD has been promoting the liberalization of capital
account operations among its members since the early 1960s. However, the code of liberalization cov-
ering cross-border services has not been yet agreed (OECD, 2002). The General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) is the only agreement at the international level which regulates and liberalizes
trade in ﬁnancial services as well as investment of ﬁnancial services providers.10 The GATS agreement
was negotiated in the Uruguay Round (1986-1994). Members (self-)committed to launch successive
rounds of services negotiations with a view to achieving a progressively higher level of liberalization.
The ﬁrst such round was to begin no later than ﬁve years from the date of entry into force of the
Agreement and, accordingly, started in 2000. Within the time frame of the overall negotiating deadline
of 1 January 2005, the Doha Development Agenda establishes that “participants shall submit initial
requests for speciﬁc commitments by 30 June 2002 and initial oﬀers by 31 March 2003”. Needless to
say that large restrictions in trade in services are still in place and their elimination is under policy
discussion.
Therefore, we assess the determinants of cross-border M&As in such activities separately, as pooling
them in regression analysis would be inappropriate, given diﬀerent developments on the process of
liberalization of trade and investment in manufacturing and services. This is especially important
when we test the impact of market regulations on cross-border M&As.
The key ﬁndings can be summarized as follows: (1) EMU helped the restructuring of capital within
the same sector of manufacturing activity, thereby enhancing eﬃciency, particularly among euro area
ﬁrms; (2) joining the EU implies adopting the Single European Market Act, which favored both
horizontal and vertical mergers; (3) the acquiring sector’s expected proﬁtability is a key driver of cross-
border M&As; (4) policymakers can help attract capital by reducing the corporate tax rates and the
degree of market regulations and by improving the country’s ﬁnancial systems. As expected, the degree
of market regulations plays a key-role for M&As in the service sector (but not for manufacturing); (5)
physical and cultural proximities facilitate cross-border M&As, while geographical distance is much
more relevant for developing countries.
Overall, we shed light on the major role played by European integration to foster cross-border
M&As between EMU countries in the manufacturing sector (preferential ﬁnancial liberalization). On
top of this reallocation inside EMU, we also ﬁnd that manufacturing sectors of both EU and EMU
have attracted equity capital from the rest of developed countries (unilateral ﬁnancial liberalization).
10According to the GATS agreement, trade in services can take diﬀerent forms: cross-border trade, consumption
abroad, commercial presence, and presence of natural persons. Commercial presence implies that a service supplier of
one member establishes a territorial presence, including through ownership or lease of premises, in another member’s
territory to provide a service (e.g. domestic subsidiaries of foreign insurance companies or hotel chains).11
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The European integration eﬀects are not found in the service industry. We provide some evidence
suggesting that capital reallocation in services did not occur owing to the high degree of product
market regulations in these sectors, which hindered entry of foreign ﬁrms in national markets.
The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows: Section 2 describes the estimation
strategy following the literature on gravity and FDI and presents the data. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the
main empirical results for manufacturing and services, respectively. Section 5 presents some additional
results on the role of EMU, ﬁnancial depth and distance. Section 6 concludes.
2 Estimation strategy to model cross-border M&As
2.1 Theoretical motivation
We follow Head and Ries (2005, 2007) to model the location decision of multinational ﬁrms through
M&As.11 For simplicity, we abstract from time and sectoral subscripts.
Denote with pij the probability that a randomly drawn company from country i acquires a ran-
domly drawn target in country j. Using the total stock of targets in country j (kj) and the total
number of potential acquiring company in country i (mi), the expected value of mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&Aij) between country i and j is:
E(M&Aij)=mipijkj (1)
Assume also that net proﬁts from an acquiring company si in country (i) for an investment in
country j are [πi−σtij+εsij], where πi is the discounted value of the gross proﬁts due to the proﬁtability
of the merger, tij denote transaction costs between markets i and j (note that tij can be a multi-
dimensional vector) and εsij is random term of unobserved ﬁrm level characteristics, independently
distributed with Type I Extreme value cumulative distribution (CDF(ε) = exp(−exp(−ε))).




l ml exp(πl − σtlj)
(2)
where the probability to win the bid for a ﬁrm in country i is positively related to the discounted
value of its expected proﬁts and negatively related to transaction costs; but it also depends on the
position of all the potential competitors, Bj =

l ml exp(πl − σtlj), with respect to market j. Using





11See also Guimaraes, Figueirdo and Woodward (2003).12
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where Bj is a measure of the “ﬁnancial remoteness” of market j. The interpretation of this term is
clearcut: (i) the higher the discounted value of the expected proﬁts of all other potential buyers or
(ii) the easier it is for all potential acquiring ﬁrms to buy a target ﬁrm in country j, the more diﬃcult
it is for a ﬁrm in country i to compete on such an asset. Given the analogy with the “multilateral
resistance factor” developed in the trade literature (Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003)), Bj is alike
the “market potential” (or “supplier access”). We can rewrite (3) as follows:
E(M&Aij) = exp(log(mi) + log(kj) − log(Bj)+πi − σtij) (4)
where mi and kj are related to market sizes, πi is related to the proﬁtability of investments in country
i and tij is related to transaction costs between markets.
We can therefore use the gravity equations framework to estimate the impact of various determi-
nants of cross-border M&A in a given sector s, which takes the following form12
M&Aij,s,t = eαieαjeαteαs(Gdpi,s,t Gdpj,s,t)βZθ
ij,s,tηij,s,t (5)
where M&Aij,s,t denotes M&A between source country i (acquirer) and host country j (target) at
time t in sector s, Gdpi,s,t (resp. Gdpj,s,t) stands for the market size of sector s in country i (resp.
j), Zij,s,t is a set of control variables (linked to expected proﬁtability of ﬁrms, transactions costs and
other barriers) that might aﬀect cross-border M&A and αi, αj, αt and αs are the source and host
country ﬁxed eﬀects, a time-ﬁxed eﬀect and a sectoral ﬁxed-eﬀect respectively. ηij,s,t is an error term
assumed to be statistically independent of the regressors.
The use of acquirer/target ﬁxed-eﬀects is necessary to control for unobservable countries charac-
teristics in order to limit potential biases due to omitted variables in the estimation. In particular, it
allows to control for the “ﬁnancial remoteness” Bj of some host markets (assumed to be constant over
time). We also control for time ﬁxed-eﬀects since cross-border M&As have been strongly increasing
over time due to increasing ﬁnancial integration across countries. As for Zij,s,t, we assume that they
are function of geography, institutions and ﬁnancial variables capturing expected proﬁtability of ﬁrms.
Variables are described in detail in the following subsections.
2.2 Description of the data on mergers and acquisitions
We construct an annual panel of cross-border M&As of completed transactions in the manufacturing
sector and services at the second digit for a sample of 21 “source” (acquiring) countries and 31 “host”
(target) countries using Thomson Financial (SDC Platinum) over the 1985-2004 period. Countries
and sectors (10 manufacturing and 10 service sectors) are described in the Appendix (section 7.2).
12For other theoretical foundations of gravity models for FDI, see among others Bergstrand and Egger (2007) and
Ramondo (2007).13
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The panel covers the largest industrialized markets, which accounts for a very large share of cross-
border M&As. For example, over the 1999-2004 period, the panel covers 74% of the world cross-border
M&As (72% in manufacturing and 75% in services). Over this period, the total annual transactions
covered by the panel amount to EUR 458 billions. Over the period considered, services accounted for
about one half of total cross-border M&As. At the end of the 1980s, cross-border M&As accounted
for about one tenth the amount of transactions recorded at the turn of the new century (see Tables
18 and 19 in the Appendix).
Over the period considered, the most important acquiring manufacturing sectors in terms of size
accounting for almost three quarters of global M&As in manufacturing are (i) chemicals, petroleum,
coal, rubber and plastic products, (ii) machinery and equipment, and (iii) food, beverages and tobacco.
For services, one third of world M&A in services involved electric, gas and water supply as the acquiring
sector with Japan being very active. The second most important sector is ﬁnancial intermediation
excluding banking and insurance with the United States playing an important role.
We divide the twenty years sectoral observations in two main groups:
1) M&As occuring within the same sector (“within sectors”): acquirer and target ﬁrms belong to
the same sector.
2) M&As occuring across sectors (“across sectors”): the acquirer ﬁrm is targeting a ﬁrm whose
main activity does not belong to the sector of the acquirer (according to our level of disaggregation).
Broadly speaking, this decomposition allows us to indirectly disentangle the determinants of M&As
driven to allocate eﬃciently production across the globe from M&As that are intended to build con-
glomerates (and essentially driven by risk diversiﬁcation motives or “empire building” motives). In
the sample, around two thirds of M&A transactions have occurred within the same sector.
2.3 Description of the regressors
Following expression (5), we study M&As by assessing the roles of market size, transaction costs and
ﬁrms’ expected proﬁtability.
The ﬁrst key variable is sectoral GDP in the source and the host country at time t. We restrict
the elasticity to be the same for country i and country j by using the log of the product of the two
GDPs at date t (log(Gdpi,s,t Gdpj,s,t)), but none of the results depend on this restriction.
As for transaction costs, the empirical literature on trade and FDI ﬂows points out the roles of
geography and institutional settings. Accordingly, we use the bilateral geographical distance13 between
the main cities of country i and country j denoted by Distij and a dummy Borderij, which equals one
when the two countries share a common border. We also use the dummy ComLangij, which equals
13Geographical distance is taken from the data set on manufacturing trade of the World Bank (Nicita and Olarreaga
(2007)).14
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one if the two countries share a common language.
As for the institutional setting, we control for the quality of institutions in the source (resp. host)
country by means of an indicator of civil liberties CivLibi,t (resp. CivLibj,t) at time t, which measures
over time and across countries the freedom of expression and belief, the association and organization
rights, the rule of law and human rights, personal autonomy and economic rights. Civil liberties is
taken from Freedom House and ranges between one (the best country) and seven (the worst country).
It quantiﬁes the expansion of political democracy, personal liberties, and good government practices,
which has been remarkable over the years, also because the abuse of power by governments and their
interference with the lives of their citizens have generally been on the declining trend. We expect
that an improvement in countries’ civil liberties reduces the cost of capital and encourages investment
in these economies. We choose this indicator rather than an indicator of institutional quality more
related to economic concepts mostly because of its wide cross-country coverage over the sample. This
indicator is nevertheless highly correlated to other institutional variables, such as corruption indices
from Transparency International or variables from La Porta et al. (2006).
In discussing the institutional setting, given the important role of EU and particularly euro area
ﬁrms in cross-border deals, it is useful to assess the role of European integration. To study the impact of
EMU we use two dummies constructed as follows: Emui,t Emuj,t is equal to one if both countries belong
to EMU at time t and zero otherwise; nonEmui,t Emuj,t is equal to one when the host country j belongs
to the euro zone but not the source country. Using two diﬀerent dummies allow us to quantify the
impact of EMU on cross-border M&A both within the euro area (preferential ﬁnancial liberalization)
and between countries outside the EMU and EMU countries (unilateral ﬁnancial liberalization). One
could also add a dummy equal to 1 when the source country belongs to EMU but not the target.
Indeed, one could potentially expect some diversion eﬀects similar to the trade literature. However,
this dummy was never signiﬁcant and we decided not to consider it in our analysis.
A similar set of dummies is used to study the eﬀect of EU: Eui,t Euj,t is equal to one if both
countries belong to the EU at time t and zero otherwise; nonEui,t Euj,t is equal to one when the
target belongs to the EU but not the acquirer.
As for expected proﬁtability of ﬁrms, a neoclassical model of investment predicts that countries with
higher Tobin’s q increase their capital stock also through cross-border M&As. Therefore, we control






One could argue that the Tobin’s q should be measured by the market-to-book ratio but unfortunately
such a variable is not available for a wide cross-section of countries over the period considered. For the
countries on which data is available, the market-to-book ratio is highly correlated with market-to-GDP15
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ratio: the correlation coeﬃcient is as high as 0.9.14
We also control for the market value-GDP ratio of the target country j, as M&As might be more






The use of the market capitalization to GDP ratio of acquirer and target countries can also help
controlling for equity bubbles, which ex post was particularly evident at the turn of the century. Data
market capitalization is the yearly average market value of the sector from Thomson Datastream and
data on sectoral GDPs are obtained from OECD (Stan database).
Finally, we study the role played by some other potential barriers to cross-border M&As such
as corporate taxation and product market regulation. We do not include these variables in our
benchmark regressions but add them in some robustness checks as they are not available for the whole
set of countries considered.
We assess the role of corporate taxation using annual corporate tax rates constructed by Devereux
and Griﬃth (2003) for a wide range of OECD countries.15
As for product market regulations, the OECD has constructed comprehensive and internationally-
comparable set of indicators that measure the degree to which policies promote or inhibit competition
in areas of the product market where competition is viable. Speciﬁcally, the indicators cover for-
mal regulations in the following areas: state control of business enterprizes, legal and administrative
barriers to entrepreneurship, barriers to international trade and investment16. Two diﬀerent types
of product market indicators exist that are consistent across time and countries: (1) economy-wide
indicators and (2) sectoral indicators for a given country.
(1) The economy-wide indicator is an index that summarizes a large set of rules and regulations that
have the potential to reduce the strength of competition (regulations to entry, public ownership and
degree of competition). This indicator has been constructed for the economy as a whole only at two
points in time - 1998 and 2003 - and for the service industry for annual period between 1975 and 2003.
Given that the correlation between the aggregate indicators for services and the whole economy for
the two years 1998 and 2003 is very high (around 0.8), the indicator on the regulation for services is
used as a proxy for the degree of product market regulation also in manufacturing to cover the time
dimension of the sample. Moreover, the OECD disaggregates the product market regulation indica-
tor in three diﬀerent dimensions: an index of regulation excluding public ownership (based on entry
barriers and degree of competition), an index of entry barriers and an index of public ownership. We
make use of these disaggregated components, as they can provide valuable information about which
14Note that this correlation should be unity if the capital-output ratio were constant.
15Data on corporate taxation among OECD countries over the period 1984-2004 are taken from M.P Devereux’s
website. See Devereux and Griﬃth (2003) and Devereux, Griﬃth and Klemm (2002).
16Data on product regulations are available only for OECD countries (see Indicator of Product Market Regulations
on the OECD website for data source).16
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dimension of regulations matters most for cross-border M&As.
(2) The sectoral indicators in OECD countries between 1975 and 2003 are computed assessing the
degree of regulations in some key service industries, such as airline, rail and road transport, elec-
tricity and gas, post and telecommunications and retail distribution (see Conway et al. (2005) and
Conway and Nicoletti (2006)). They measure the potential costs of anti-competitive regulation in a
given sector of the economy. Conversely, the indicators for manufacturing are incomplete, as they are
simply imputed from those in services using input-output tables: the indicators for manufacturing are
increasing with the use of the output of the service industries as intermediate inputs in the production
process of the sector.
The descriptive statistics concerning the sectoral indicators (across countries and across sectors)
are provided in the appendix (see Tables 16 and 17). They indicate that services are strongly regulated
particularly in Greece and France and less so in New Zealand, the UK and the US.
Finally, as robustness checks, we also control for bilateral trade in goods at the sectoral level as
well as the ﬁnancial depth of a country using the ratio of domestic credit to GDP in the target and
acquiring country at a given date. Sectoral goods trade data (exports) are provided by the World Bank
(Nicita and Olarreaga (2007)), while domestic credit over GDP is provided by the World Development
Indicators of the World Bank.
2.4 Speciﬁcation and methodology
Cross-border M&As (M&Aij,s,t) are the total value of assets purchased through M&As in the target
country j ﬁrms in sector s resident in country i at year t. The determinants of such variable are
obtained estimating the following regression
M&Aij,s,t = exp[αi + αj + αt + αs + β1 log(Gdpi,s,tGdpj,s,t)+β2 log(Distij)+β3Borderij + β4ComLangij







+γ2nonEmui,t Emuj,t + δ1Eui,t Euj,t + δ2nonEui,t Euj,t + θzij,s,t] (6)
where the α’s are our set of ﬁxed-eﬀects, which control for unobservable country/sector characteristics,
and zij,s,t is a set of additional controls variables (not used in our benchmark regressions), such as
corporate taxation, product market regulation, exports and credit.
Once taken into account data attrition caused by our control variables, we have about 8000 ob-
servations in each manufacturing or service sector; since we have 10 sectors in manufacturing (resp.
10 in services), this makes approximately 80,000 observations in manufacturing (resp. 80,000 obser-
vations in services) of which about 5% are non-zero. Indeed, at a given date, in a given sector and
for a given pair of countries, it is very likely that no M&A deal occurs. The lack of M&As deals17
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in the sample leads to biased estimators in standard OLS regression and therefore we use Poisson
Maximum-Likelihood estimators throughout the analysis (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), and
Head and Ries (2007)).17 As explained by Razin and Sadka (2007a, 2007b), Tobit estimators are
consistent if the presence of zeroes is due to measurement errors (some transactions are not observed).
While our data are certainly subject to some measurement errors (some M&As might not be recorded
by Thomson Financial), most of the zeroes are “true zeroes” in the sense that no M&As occur that
year for a given sector s and a given country-pair {i;j}. In that case, Tobit estimator are likely to be
biased. Therefore, the discussion of the empirical results is based on Poisson estimations.
Being concerned by the large amount of zeroes, we also ran regressions on bilateral cross-border
M&As at the aggregate level (where non-zero observations account for more than 20%): the estimates
are fully consistent with the results obtained using sectoral data. Therefore, we mostly focus the
analysis showing regression at the sectoral level (except for some robustness checks on the role of
EMU in Section 5 of the paper).
3 Cross-border M&As in manufacturing sectors
3.1 Total cross-border M&As
The results of the benchmark speciﬁcations for total manufacturing obtained using Poisson quasi-
MLE are shown in Table 1. The sectoral regressions cover the period 1985-2003 due to the lack of
the sectoral value added in 2004, while the aggregate regressions (non reported because results are
broadly similar) are based over the period 1985-2004.
Common language and border dummies are signiﬁcant. The estimates of the common language
dummy is fully in line with previous estimates of Head and Ries (2007). Surprisingly, the impact of
geographical distance is close to zero and non signiﬁcant while in previous papers it has been shown
to be a major determinant for M&A transactions (Di Giovanni (2005), Goerg, Hijzen and Manchin,
(2006), Head and Ries (2007)).18 We attribute this ﬁnding to the combination of three factors. First,
as shown by Head and Ries (2007) and Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), estimates tend to be strongly
biased upwards in standard OLS or Tobit estimations, which have been widely used in past literature.19
Second, most countries in our sample are developed markets. If distance proxies for information costs
(Portes and Rey (2005)) or monitoring costs (Head and Ries (2007)), it is very likely that such costs
are much less distance related among developed markets. Finally, the speciﬁcation includes a border
17Razin and Sadka (2007a, 2007b) also show the bias in OLS or Tobit estimations and correct it using an alternative
method based on an Heckman-selection model.
18We also tested a dummy variable for a common legal system, following La Porta et al. (1998) but this variable was
not signiﬁcant.
19In an non-reported regression, we ﬁnd that Tobit estimations give a large impact of distance on M&A transactions.
Other variables of interest were essentially unaﬀected.18
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dummy and regional agreement dummies which are partly collinear with the distance variable.20 We
will investigate further the role of distance in section (5.4).
Cross-border M&Aij,s,t in manufacturing
(1) (2) (3)
log(Gdpi,s,t Gdpj,s,t) .924∗∗∗ .907∗∗∗ .812∗∗∗
(.186) (.183) (.177)
log(Disti,j) -.064 -.059 -.056
(.124) (.124) (.125)
Borderij .404∗ .407∗ .392∗
(.227) (.226) (.226)
ComLangij .566∗∗∗ .564∗∗∗ .580∗∗∗
(.166) (.167) (.164)
Emui,t Emuj,t 1.013∗∗∗ .995∗∗∗ .940∗∗∗
(.355) (.344) (.336)
NonEmui,t Emuj,t .586∗∗ .570∗∗ .599∗∗
(.246) (.247) (.249)
Eui,t Euj,t 1.100∗ 1.039∗ 1.132∗∗
(.568) (.558) (.564)




















Source country dummies yes yes yes
Target country dummies yes yes yes
Sectoral dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
# Obs. 78490 78490 76642
Table 1: Gravity Models on bilateral M&As at the sectoral level (manufacturing sector).
Estimation using Poisson-QMLE estimators. Country dummies of acquiring countries and target countries,
sectoral dummies, and time-dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust
standard errors. Observations are clustered within country pairs.
The quality of institutions in the host country is found to be an important determinant: countries
with poor civil liberties might have a higher cost of capital and therefore are relatively less attractive.
The eﬀect is quantitatively important since an improvement of the indicator of civil liberties in the
host country from 5 (the level of Turkey) to 1 (the US) doubles inward cross-border M&As ceteris
20Without any other controls but market sizes, the elasticity of distance is signiﬁcant, yet much lower than previous
estimates (estimates is −0.2).19
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paribus.
The interpretation of the EMU eﬀects is relatively straightforward: the adoption of the single
currency has increased both cross-border M&As between euro area countries (preferential ﬁnancial
liberalization, γ1   0.95) and M&As from non-euro area countries towards euro area countries (unilat-
eral ﬁnancial liberalization, γ2   0.6). The magnitude of these eﬀects is large since the single currency
has raised respectively intra-euro area cross-border M&As by 160% and M&As from non-euro area
countries towards euro area countries by 80%. In other words, EMU has increased cross-border M&As
towards the euro area from all over the globe (including the individual euro area countries) by 80% with
an additional increase between euro area countries of about 40%.21 The EMU eﬀects on cross-border
M&As are of the same order of magnitude than those found for the reallocation of bond portfolios
and larger than those found for equity portfolios (see Lane (2005), Coeurdacier and Martin (2006),
De Santis and Gerard (2006)).
Similarly to the criticisms against the common currency eﬀect on trade, it could be argued that the
EMU eﬀects are too large because the gravity equations are not well performed. First, we control for
the common preferential trade agreement (the EU), geography as well as institution quality. Second,
the EMU eﬀects are neither driven by unobservable characteristics of euro area countries (controlled
by source/host countries ﬁxed eﬀects), nor by an increasing number of M&As through time due to
ﬁnancial liberalization (controlled by the time ﬁxed-eﬀects), nor by some cyclical properties of stock
prices in euro countries around the beginning of the EMU (controlled by both the acquirer and the
target countries market capitalization). Still, it can be argued that EMU dummies are capturing the
impact of some omitted variables. In the next section, we will try a number of potential candidates
(trade, taxation and market regulations)22. Moreover, we run some additional robustness checks in
section 5, focusing on the impact of EMU over time by controlling for unobservable factors with EMU
that have been constant over time. Results hardly change.
The results concerning the EU eﬀects are similar to those described for EMU, but note that
δ1 =1 .13 and δ2 =0 .87 are not very diﬀerent; everything else equal, the EU Single market has mostly
increased M&As towards the EU from all countries in the world. We have weak evidence that the
EU fostered M&As between EU countries in addition to the unilateral ﬁnancial liberalization eﬀect.
Overall, the additional “M&A creating” eﬀect of the EU is slightly less robust than for EMU.
Finally, sectoral M&As strongly react to movements in the market capitalization to GDP ratio of
the acquiring sector. Sectors experiencing a stock market boom tend to expand by investing abroad
21Given the functional form (5) and the deﬁnition of the two EMU dummies, the additional EMU eﬀect between euro
area countries is computed as follows e
γ1−γ2 − 1.
22We also control for bilateral nominal exchange rate volatility. Results remain invariant and this additional control
was not signiﬁcant (non-reported).20
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through M&As. This is consistent with standard Q-theory of investment. The estimates are both
signiﬁcant and large in magnitude. One could have expected that ﬁrms tend to buy assets in countries
experiencing a drop in asset prices. This would be consistent with an eﬃcient reallocation of capital
from high Q countries towards low Q countries (see Jovanovic and Rousseau (2008)). This does not
seem to be the case, since the estimate is not signiﬁcant (even though the sign is negative).
Bris et al. (2007) show that the euro has increased Tobin’s q-ratios among 11 euro area member
states relative to the other 5 European countries. Part of the increase in corporate valuations is
explained by the decrease in interest rates and by the decrease in the cost of equity. This result is very
interesting in the light of our paper because the impact of EMU via the stock market capitalization to
GDP ratio would capture the eﬀect of the reduction of the cost of capital, while the binary variables
would capture other elements linked to the removal of barriers to ﬁnancial trade, which have all
facilitated the reallocation of capital among euro area countries.
3.2 Cross-border M&As within and across sectors
How do results change when considering horizontal and vertical cross-border M&As separately? Re-
sults with such decomposition are shown in Table 2.
EMU increased intra euro area horizontal cross-border M&As in manufacturing by about 200%.
The estimated eﬀect on euro area M&As from non-euro to euro area countries amounts to about 70%,
but it is statistically signiﬁcant at 15% level. The impact of the euro on vertical M&As between euro
area countries is not statistically signiﬁcant, while non-euro area countries seem to have diversiﬁed
their investment risk purchasing euro area assets. Therefore, the euro has facilitated cross-border
M&As within the euro area, which aimed at restructuring capital within the same sector of activity,
rather then boosting the formation of conglomerate activities between euro area sectors.
Both EU binary variables are very similar in magnitude in both horizontal and vertical mergers
of the manufacturing sector. However, reducing the number of observed deals by cutting the sample
in two increases the standard errors of the variables capturing the EU eﬀect in (i) intra-EU horizon-
tal activity and (ii) extra-EU vertical mergers targeting EU ﬁrms, thereby making the coeﬃcients
statistically signiﬁcant only at 10-15% conﬁdence interval.
A 1% increase in the stock market capitalization to GDP ratio in a given country is associated with
a 0.4% increase in mergers within the same sector (horizontal) from ﬁrms of that country, while the
response of mergers across sectors (vertical) is twice as large (0.8%). We see that as a conﬁrmation that
stock market developments and proﬁtability are important drivers of M&As whatever their nature.
As for the institutional setting, we ﬁnd the variable to be statistically signiﬁcant only for mergers
across sectors (vertical). The variable aims at capturing the degree of economic freedom in a country.21
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Cross-border M&Aij,s,t in manufacturing
Within sectors Across sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Gdpi,s,t Gdpj,s,t) .970∗∗∗ .883∗∗∗ .771∗∗∗ .690∗∗∗
(.226) (.228) (.261) (.248)
log(Disti,j) -.060 -.059 -.114 -.101
(.155) (.156) (.243) (.244)
Borderij .658∗∗ .646∗∗ -.138 -.152
(.300) (.299) (.391) (.383)
ComLangij .217 .226 1.156∗∗∗ 1.192∗∗∗
(.234) (.233) (.245) (.233)
Emui,t Emuj,t 1.121∗∗∗ 1.090∗∗ .477 .377
(.434) (.430) (.379) (.368)
NonEmui,t Emuj,t .494 .519 .839∗∗ .882∗∗
(.327) (.331) (.363) (.364)
Eui,t Euj,t 1.016 1.091 1.279∗∗ 1.410∗∗∗
(.698) (.691) (.503) (.525)
NonEui,t Euj,t .898∗ .967∗ .786 .876
(.516) (.517) (.563) (.544)
CivLibi,t -.334 -.284 .130 .200
(.267) (.273) (.266) (.285)
CivLibj,t -.363 -.355 -1.484∗∗∗ -1.445∗∗∗















Source country dummies yes yes yes yes
Target country dummies yes yes yes yes
Sectoral dummies yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 78490 76642 78490 76642
Table 2: Gravity Models on bilateral M&As at the sectoral level (manufacturing sector): M&As within
and across sectors (other).
Estimation using Poisson-QMLE estimators. Country dummies of acquiring countries and target countries,
sectoral dummies, and time-dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust
standard errors. Observations are clustered within country pairs.
The higher the degree of liberties in the target countries, the easier it is for ﬁrms with their main
activities based in other countries to build conglomerates by acquiring, or merging with, those ﬁrms
located in freer markets.
The border eﬀect is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for horizontal mergers in manufacturing.
Sharing a common border might imply a rise in competition and these stimulated mergers. Common
language is also considered a potential factor reducing the cost of doing business. The latter is22
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signiﬁcant for vertical mergers. Overall, the results suggest that physical and cultural proximity are
determinants of cross-border mergers in manufacturing.
3.3 The role of trade, corporate taxation and product market regulation
3.3.1 The role of trade in goods
A key variable, which might have been aﬀected by EMU and potentially correlates with cross-border
M&As, is bilateral goods trade, even though the impact of EMU on trade has been shown to be
empirically very small (Flam and Nordstrom (2003); see also Baldwin (2006) for a survey). We are
aware that bilateral goods trade and cross-border M&A ﬂows should be simultaneously determined,
but we cannot provide useful instruments to goods trade that are independent from cross-border
M&As. Having said that, the endogeneity is more an issue for ﬁrms’ sales and less for investment, as
the latter requires an adjustment period before it is translated into production. Thus, we simply run
the previous regression and control for the log of bilateral manufacturing exports23 between country
i and country j in sector s divided by the product of GDPs at date t (log(
Exportij,s,t
Gdpi,s,tGdpj,s,t)). In theory,
cross-border M&As can be trade creating (due to intra-ﬁrm trade for instance) or a substitute for
trade. In our regression, we ﬁnd the impact of trade to be not statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests
that the two potential theoretical channels of trade on M&As cancel out in the data, even though
such a conclusion must be taken with extreme caution since it is hard to infer any causality from this
regression. Most importantly, the EU/EMU eﬀects are robust when we control for trade in goods.
3.3.2 The role of corporate taxation
Next we assess the role of corporate taxation for two reasons. First, the results might have clear policy
recommendation, as it is generally argued that multinational ﬁrms tend to expand in countries where
tax rates are on average lower. Second, the convergence in corporate taxes among EU and EMU
countries over time might bias the estimates on the EU/EMU binary variables. Therefore, we control
for the diﬀerence in eﬀective average corporate tax rates (in percentage points) between host country
j and source country i at date t (Eatrj,t − Eatri,t).
The impact of the diﬀerence in corporate tax rates has the expected sign and is strongly signiﬁcant
(see Table 4); the semi-elasticity with respect to diﬀerences in corporate taxation is found to be equal
to -4.6. This estimate is broadly in line with estimates by Razin and Sadka (2007a), who found
elasticities ranging from -3 to -5 for FDI ﬂows among OECD countries (see also Devereux and Griﬃth
(1998), Benassy et al. (2005) and Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2005)). Columns 2 and 3 indicate
that M&As within the same sector are those mostly aﬀected by corporate taxation with an elasticity
equal to -6.8, suggesting that increasing by 10 percentage points the corporate tax in the host country
23We also used bilateral imports and an average of bilateral import and exports. Results are very similar.23
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Cross-border M&Aij,s,t in manufacturing
all within sectors across sectors
(1) (2) (3)
log(Gdpi,t Gdpj,t) .926∗∗∗ 1.046∗∗∗ .693∗∗∗
(.178) (.220) (.248)
log(Disti,j) -.015 .011 -.138
(.140) (.179) (.257)
Borderij .526∗∗ .699∗∗ .141
(.225) (.292) (.404)
ComLangij .600∗∗∗ .160 1.379∗∗∗
(.186) (.264) (.247)
Emui,t Emuj,t .993∗∗∗ 1.171∗∗ .272
(.369) (.467) (.361)
NonEmui,t Emuj,t .630∗∗ .553∗ .882∗∗
(.254) (.336) (.350)
Eui,t Euj,t 1.142∗∗ 1.015 1.600∗∗∗
(.582) (.696) (.565)
NonEui,t Euj,t .872∗ 1.009∗∗ .846
(.450) (.510) (.531)
CivLibi,t -.002 -.180 .264
(.224) (.294) (.305)























Source country dummies yes yes yes
Target country dummies yes yes yes
Sectoral dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
# Obs. 62571 62571 62571
Table 3: Gravity Models on Bilateral M&As at the sectoral level in manufacturing: The role of trade.
Estimation using Poisson-QMLE estimators. Country dummies of acquiring countries and target countries,
sectoral dummies, and time-dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust
standard errors. Observations are clustered within country pairs.24
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Cross-border M&Aij,s,t in manufacturing
all within sectors across sectors
(1) (2) (3)
log(Gdpi,s,t Gdpj,s,t) .934∗∗∗ 1.065∗∗∗ .731∗∗∗
(.182) (.225) (.262)
log(Disti,j) -.025 -.019 -.082
(.132) (.167) (.264)
Borderij .452∗ .708∗∗ -.083
(.242) (.326) (.392)
ComLangij .506∗∗∗ .110 1.202∗∗∗
(.173) (.250) (.239)
Emui,t Emuj,t .899∗∗∗ 1.051∗∗ .362
(.327) (.419) (.395)
NonEmui,t Emuj,t .480∗∗ .339 .890∗∗
(.237) (.319) (.380)
Eui,t Euj,t .862 .604 1.654∗∗∗
(.645) (.773) (.638)
NonEui,t Euj,t .545 .403 1.103
(.508) (.545) (.685)
CivLibi,t -.049 -.204 .195
(.220) (.277) (.300)
















Eatri,t − Eatrj,t -4.593∗∗ -6.804∗∗∗ -1.593
(1.835) (2.212) (2.589)
Source country dummies yes yes yes
Target country dummies yes yes yes
Sectoral dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
# Obs. 47234 47234 47234
Table 4: Gravity Models on Bilateral M&As at the sectoral level in manufacturing: The role of
corporate taxation.
Estimation using Poisson-QMLE estimators. Country dummies of acquiring countries and target countries,
sectoral dummies, and time-dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust
standard errors. Observations are clustered within country pairs.25
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Cross-border M&Aij,s,t in manufacturing
all within other all within other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Sect. Regulationj,s,t) .237 .366 .289
(.692) (.932) (.893)
log(Agg. Regulationj,t) -.569 -.904 -.116
(.693) (.878) (.954)
Source country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Target country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sectoral dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 60506 60506 60506 60506 60506 60506
Table 5: Gravity Models on bilateral M&As at the sectoral level (manufacturing sector): the impact
of product market regulations (1).
Estimation using Poisson-QMLE estimators. Country dummies of acquiring countries and target countries,
time-dummies and sectoral dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust
standard errors. Observations are clustered within country pairs.
(while keeping the taxes in the source country constant) reduces horizontal cross-border M&A by 68%.
This result points towards a substitution eﬀect of corporate taxation on ﬁrms’ investment decisions.
The estimates on all other variables are essentially unaﬀected, despite the sample is now halved.
3.3.3 The role of product market regulations
Then, we investigate the impact of product market regulations. The results reported in Tables 5 and
6 indicate that the impact of product market regulations on cross-border M&As in the manufacturing
sector is very weak (other variables are not reported but estimates were not aﬀected by this additional
control). The sectoral variable log(Sect. Regulationj,s,t) that measures the potential costs of ser-
vice regulations on a given manufacturing sector is not signiﬁcant (not even correctly signed). The
economy-wide indicator of regulation log(Agg. Regulationj,t) is correctly signed but not signiﬁcant
(only regulations excluding public ownership, a variable mainly capturing the degree of oligopoly in a
country, is somewhat statistically signiﬁcant).
All these results are potentially biased as the indicators are constructed using regulations of the
service sectors. However, we believe that regulations plays a lower role in cross-border MAs in man-
ufacturing, as such activities have been strongly liberalized, particularly since the beginning of the
1990s.26
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Cross-border M&Aij,s,t in manufacturing
all within all within all within
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)






Source country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Target country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sectoral dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 60506 60506 60506 60506 60506 60506
Table 6: Gravity Models on bilateral M&As at the sectoral level (manufacturing sector): the impact
of product market regulation (2).
Estimation using Poisson-QMLE estimators. Country dummies of acquiring countries and target countries,
time-dummies and sectoral dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust
standard errors. Observations are clustered within country pairs. Control variables of the benchmark regression
included but not reported.
4 Cross-border M&As in services
4.1 Benchmark regressions
In this section, we perform a similar empirical analysis but for cross-border M&As in services, using
the same country sample, the same period 1985-2004 and the same methodology as in manufacturing.
The ﬁrst set of results are reported in Table 7. The sectoral regressions cover the period 1985-2003
due to the lack of the sectoral value added in 2004, while the aggregate regressions (non reported
because results are broadly similar) are based over the period 1985-2004.27
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Cross-border M&Aij,s,t in services
all within sectors across sectors
(1) (2) (3)
log(Gdpi,s,t Gdpj,s,t) .155 .142 .052
(.217) (.298) (.223)
log(Disti,j) -.075 -.218 -.096
(.177) (.201) (.187)
Borderij 1.303∗∗∗ 1.413∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗
(.348) (.391) (.375)
ComLangij .648∗∗∗ 1.100∗∗∗ .256
(.239) (.300) (.343)
Emui,t Emuj,t -.399 -.569 -.167
(.280) (.410) (.355)
NonEmui,t Emuj,t .448 .827 -.305
(.540) (.697) (.369)
Eui,t Euj,t .598 .470 .585
(.382) (.375) (.531)
NonEui,t Euj,t -.295 -1.006 .678
(.575) (.624) (.593)
CivLibi,t .238 .167 .295
(.314) (.408) (.306)
















Source country dummies yes yes yes
Target country dummies yes yes yes
Sectoral dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
# Obs. 83034 83034 83034
Table 7: Gravity Models on Bilateral M&As at the sectoral level in services.
Estimation using Poisson-QMLE estimators. Country dummies of acquiring countries and target countries,
sectoral dummies, and time-dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust
standard errors. Observations are clustered within country pairs.
Unlike in manufacturing, European integration (captured by EMU and EU dummies) has not
fostered cross-border reallocation of capital in the service industry. Services regulations fall within
the competence of individual EU Member States and the EU internal market for services remains to
date very fragmented. Only in December 2006, the European Parliament and Council have adopted
the Directive on services in the internal market (commonly referred to as the Bolkestein Directive), an
initiative of the European Commission aimed at creating a single market for services within the EU,28
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similar to the single market for goods.24 If this directive helps liberalizing trade in services, it might
trigger a new wave of cross-border mergers.
Although distance is not signiﬁcant, physical and cultural proximity aﬀect cross-border M&As
in services given the large and highly signiﬁcant estimates of the impacts of border and common
language. This conﬁrms the results obtained for manufacturing. Again, in our sample, geography is
not a key-driver of capital reallocation across borders. Given that existing literature founds distance
to be an important barrier to cross-border M&As (Di Giovanni (2005), Head and Ries (2007), Goerg
et al (2006)), we will investigate this issue more in depth in section (5.4).
We also ﬁnd that cross-border M&As of services are fostered by stock market expansions of the
acquiring sector. This result is robust across all speciﬁcations aiming at capturing horizontal and
vertical M—As. Quantitatively, the response to an increase in the acquiring sector’s stock market
over GDP ratio is very similar to that obtained in the case of manufacturing. This evidence conﬁrms
the major role played by stock markets developments in triggering cross-border reallocation of capital
across the globe.25
We do not report the regressions including diﬀerences in corporate taxation because it is not
statistically signiﬁcant, while we cannot control for trade in services due to lack of data. The fact that
institutions and corporate taxation are not signiﬁcant may be due to the large trade barriers existing
in the service industry. This issue is looked carefully in the next session.
4.2 The role of product market regulations
We expect the role of market regulations to be a key determinant in services, as most sectors are
strongly protected. This is conﬁrmed by the data (see Tables 8 and 9): the impact of product market
regulations on cross-border M&As in services is strong, statistically signiﬁcant and robust across the
various alternative measures. Quantitative estimates are also very similar, regardless whether using
the aggregate (log(Agg. Regulationj,t)) or the sectoral indicators (log(Sect. Regulationj,s,t)).
Interestingly, the percentage of shares owned by the government is not an impediment for cross-border
M&As in services, while tougher entry regulations or lower competition in the domestic economy
24This Directive is seen as an important kick-start to the Lisbon Agenda which, launched in 2000, is an agreed
strategy to make the EU ”the world’s most dynamic and competitive economy” by 2010. With the proposed legislation,
the Commission wants to reduce the barriers to cross-border trade in services, objectively justiﬁed on the grounds of
public interest.
25One could be concerned that we do not control well for market sizes in our regressions, which might cast doubt on
our results. Indeed, the impact of GDPs is small and not statistically signiﬁcant. But, most of the impact of market
sizes is already taken care of by the source and host country ﬁxed-eﬀects. In fact, GDP changes in the service sector are
very smooth, which makes it harder to identify their impact over time. Note that we obtain coeﬃcients on GDP close
to one when excluding ﬁxed eﬀects.29
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Cross-border M&Aij,s,t in services
all within other all within other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Sect. Regulationj,s,t) -1.268∗∗∗ -1.471∗∗∗ -1.249∗∗∗
(.295) (.456) (.314)
log(Agg. Regulationj,t) -1.135∗∗ -1.736∗∗∗ -.570
(.564) (.621) (.592)
Source country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Target country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sectoral dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 65802 65802 65802 68502 68502 68502
Table 8: Gravity Models on bilateral M&As at the sectoral level (service sector): the impact of product
market regulations (1).
Estimation using Poisson-QMLE estimators. Country dummies of acquiring countries and target countries,
time-dummies and sectoral dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust
standard errors. Observations are clustered within country pairs.
Cross-border M&Aij,s,t in services
all within all within all within
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)






Source country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Target country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sectoral dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 68502 68502 68502 68502 68502 68502
Table 9: Gravity Models on bilateral M&As at the sectoral level (service sector): the impact of product
market regulations (2).
Estimation using Poisson-QMLE estimators. Country dummies of acquiring countries and target countries,
time-dummies and sectoral dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust
standard errors. Observations are clustered within country pairs.30
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reduces the degree of foreign investment (see Table 9). Services account for around 70% of value-
added in most OECD countries and, depending on the country, account for between one-third and
one-half of total intermediate inputs of manufacturing activities (e.g. business services, transport,
telecommunications and electricity). Therefore, policymakers can attract large amounts of equity
capital by reducing the degree of market regulations in the service sectors. Quantitatively, such
policies can have large impact. According to the estimate on total cross-border M&As (and using the
aggregate index; see Table 8, column (1)), ceteris paribus, reducing the degree of regulations from the
level of the most regulated countries over the period 1998-2003 (France and Greece) to the level of
the least regulated (US and UK) could increase inward investment towards these countries by about
70%, an economically large impact.26
All in all, as for the manufacturing sector, proximity and expected proﬁtability are key determi-
nants of cross-border M&As in services. Furthermore, domestic regulations are relevant for foreign
investors, because the implied ﬁxed costs to enter the domestic market are potentially larger than the
economies of scale and scope resulting from the M&As. Conversely, institutional variables (EMU, EU,
civil liberties) perform poorly in explaining cross-border M&As in services. Most likely, the existing
international barriers in the service industry have dramatically reduced the potential role of European
integration and, more speciﬁcally, have dampened the potential impact of the adoption of the single
currency.
5 Robustness checks
5.1 Robustness checks concerning the EMU eﬀect in manufacturing
One common criticism in the literature on the role of common currencies on trade is that the usual
regression does not control for some unobservable characteristics (constant over time) in the bilateral
dimension; if such a variable increases both the probability of joining the same currency union and
the intensity of transactions between the two countries, the coeﬃcient related to the impact of the
common currency would be biased upward (see Glick and Rose (2002), Baldwin and Taglioni (2006)).
The various robustness checks require the use of additional dummy variables. In all our robustness
checks, we keep all the controls of our benchmark regression (column (3) of Table 1).
First, we identify the impact of EMU in the time-dimension, by adding a dummy variable which
is equal to one over the 1985-2004 period for country pairs inside EMU in 2004 and run the same
regression as before. Such a strategy allows us to identify the impact of EMU across-time by comparing
cross-border M&As within EMU countries after the date of the introduction of the euro with cross-
26We use the elasticity -1.3 of Table 8 (column (1)) and the degree of regulation 65% higher in France and Greece
compared to the UK/US over the period 1998-2003. See Table 17 in the appendix.31
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Cross-border M&Aij,s,t in manufacturing
All Within sectors Across sectors
(1) (2) (3)
Emui,t Emuj,t .839∗∗ .914∗∗ .603
(.377) (.464) (.393)
NonEmui,t Emuj,t .650∗∗ .615∗ .789∗∗
(.256) (.332) (.359)
Source country dummies yes yes yes
Target country dummies yes yes yes
Sectoral dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
Other controls yes yes yes
#Obs. 76642 76642 76642
Table 10: Bilateral M&As in manufacturing: The EMU eﬀects identiﬁed in the time-dimension.
Estimation using Poisson-QMLE estimators. An additional dummy constant over the whole period which equals
one for country pairs inside the EMU is included but not reported (never signiﬁcant). Country dummies of
acquiring countries and target countries and time-dummies are included but not reported. Controls of Table
1 - column (3) are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance at the
10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust standard errors.
Observations are clustered within country pairs.
border M&As within EMU countries before the introduction of EMU. We report the results in Table
10. They are almost identical to the results of the previous regressions. This additional dummy (not
reported) is not signiﬁcant while the impact of EMU, now fully estimated in the time dimension,
remains almost the same as in the previous tables.27
Finally, in order to assess how the EMU eﬀects have evolved over the 1999-2004 period, we interact
Emui,t Emuj,t with three time dummies starting in 1999: one for the years 1999-2000, one for 2001-
2002 and one for 2003. 28 As shown in Table 11 the increase in cross-border M&As within the euro
area is not restricted to a speciﬁc period though it has not been constant through time. This regression
shows that the impact of EMU has been less pronounced in 2003. Moreover, as expected, the same
interaction dummy was no diﬀerent from to zero in 1997-1998.
We conduct the same exercise using aggregate data (data aggregated across sectors), as we have
information up to 2004 and the number of non-zeros in the MAs database is increased to about 20%
of the sample. The results re ported in Table 12 conﬁrms those reported in the previous Table with
strong EMU eﬀects also in 2004.
Overall, we can safely argue that EMU helped restructuring manufacturing capital among euro
area countries.
27Another standard solution to deal with this problem is to estimate the regression with ﬁxed-eﬀects per country pairs,
αij. We run this regression (non-reported) using aggregate data and ﬁnd very similar estimates.
28We checked that32
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Cross-border M&Aij,s,t in manufacturing
All Within sectors Across sectors
(1) (2) (3)
Emui,t Emuj,t × It=1999,2000 1.002∗ 1.039∗ .450
(.519) (.607) (.393)
Emui,t Emuj,t × It=2001,2002 1.117∗∗∗ 1.788∗∗∗ .407
(.369) (.476) (.510)
Emui,t Emuj,t × It=2003,2004 .190 .225 -.026
(.479) (.585) (.771)
Source country dummies yes yes yes
Target country dummies yes yes yes
Sectoral dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
Other controls yes yes yes
#Obs. 76642 76642 76642
Table 11: Bilateral M&As: The EMU eﬀects interacted with time dummies after 1999.
Estimation using Poisson-QMLE estimators. Country dummies of acquiring countries and target countries,
time and sectoral dummies are included but not reported. Controls of Table 1 - column (3) are included but
not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are
denoted by * (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within
country pairs.
Aggregate cross-border M&Aij,t in manufacturing
all within sectors across sectors
(1) (2) (3)
Emui,t Emuj,t − 1999 1.621∗∗ 1.686∗∗ .661
(.735) (.830) (.529)
Emui,t Emuj,t − 2000 0.395 0.660 -0.130
(.438) (.601) (.450)
Emui,t Emuj,t − 2001 0.763 1.848∗ .489
(.578) (.997) (.534)
Emui,t Emuj,t − 2002 1.785∗∗∗ 2.239∗∗∗ .366
(.484) (.538) (.365)
Emui,t Emuj,t − 2003 0.230 0.318 -0.609
(.496) (.588) (.583)
Emui,t Emuj,t − 2004 0.966∗∗ 1.290∗∗ -0.114
(.46) (.520) (.914)
Source/Target country dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
Other controls yes yes yes
# Obs. 10046 10046 10046
Table 12: Bilateral Aggregate M&As: The EMU eﬀects interacted with time dummies after 1999.
Estimation using Poisson-QMLE estimators. Country dummies of acquiring countries and target countries and
time dummies are included but not reported. Controls of Table 1 - column (3) are included but not reported.
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by *
(resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within country pairs.33
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5.2 Estimating the extensive versus the intensive margins of the EMU eﬀects
We also investigate whether EMU has aﬀected the probability of engaging in M&As with an EMU
country (“extensive margin”) or aﬀected the volume of M&As among member states (“intensive mar-
gin”). Implicitly, the former would capture the eﬀect of EMU on the ﬁxed costs in undertaking M&As,
while the latter would capture the eﬀect of EMU on transaction costs. We do it using aggregate data
(data aggregated across sectors) of bilateral cross-border M&As as the number of zeroes with sectoral
data is too large given the empirical strategy we use to identify the two margins.
To assess whether EMU has inﬂuenced the decision to engage in M&As with a given country
(“extensive margin”), we compute a dummy which is set equal to one if there is at least one transaction
between country i and country j at date t (1aggM&Aij,t>0) and we run the same exercise as before with
the addition of such dummy using a logit estimation. The results on the EMU dummies are shown in
column (2) of Table 13.
We also run a standard OLS gravity regression, which excludes the zero transactions (see Table
13, column (1)). This regression is informative as it gives the impact of EMU on the size of M&As
conditionally on observing transactions (“intensive margin”).
The comparison of the two columns provides a decomposition of the overall eﬀect already measured
with the Poisson estimations. We can argue that EMU acted as “preferential liberalization” mostly
by increasing the probability of M&As between two euro area countries (Table 13, column (2)). The
“extensive margin” eﬀect is large since the probability of M&As between two euro area countries has
increased by 50% after EMU while the probability of a M&A between non-euro area countries and
euro area countries has not been aﬀected by the introduction of the euro.
The single currency has also increased the size of M&As towards the euro area from all countries
in the world including euro area countries29. The “intensive margin” eﬀect is around 50% (Table 13 -
column (1)). This decomposition is a conﬁrmation of the previous results. Indeed, if we add the two
margins, cross-border M&As (in value) have doubled between euro area countries (e0.305+0.389 = 2),
while non-euro area M&As targeting the euro area have risen by about one quarter (e0.480−0.240 =1 .27).
Using such computations, the EMU eﬀect between euro area countries in addition to the general
tendency to invest in the euro area would amount to about 50% (  2/1.27−1). These results suggest
that EMU acted through a decrease in ﬁxed-costs within EMU countries (“extensive margin”) and a
decrease in proportional transaction costs for every single country in the world (“intensive margin”).
With lower transactions costs, the euro area becomes more like one bigger economy, and this encourages
MAs also from non euro area countries.
29The estimate of the dummy Emui,t Emuj,t is even smaller than the one of the dummy nonEmui,t Emuj,t, but not
statistically diﬀerent.34
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Emui,t Emuj,t 0.305∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(.167) (.16)
nonEmui,t Emuj,t 0.480∗∗∗ -0.240
(.185) (.163)
Source country dummies yes yes
Target country dummies yes yes
Time dummies yes yes
Other controls yes yes
# Obs. 2374 10046
R2 0.36 0.40
Table 13: Bilateral Aggregate M&As: Intensive and extensive margins.
The OLS non zero estimation is a standard OLS regression dropping all zero observation. The logit estimation
is a logistic regression on a dummy variable which equals one when at least one M&A is observed for a given
year and a given country-pair. Controls of Table 1 are included but not reported (Stock market over GDP is
at the aggregate level). Country dummies of acquiring countries and target countries and time-dummies are
included but not reported. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp.
** and ***). Estimation with robust standard errors.
5.3 Investigating the role of ﬁnancial depth
The various experiments carried out in the previous sections (manufacturing versus services, horizontal
versus vertical mergers, controlling for various variables) indicate the importance of the acquiring
sector’s stock market capitalization to GDP ratio as a key variable explaining cross-border M&As.
Di Giovanni (2005) also ﬁnds aggregate cross-border M&As to be a function of aggregate stock
market capitalization. He also controlled for credit to GDP ratio of the acquirer, but the latter variable
was less signiﬁcant in his regressions. He interprets his results as the consequence of ﬁnancial depth
and puts forward ﬁnancial deepening as a key driver for M&As. While Di Giovanni (2005) does not
consider the impact of the depth of ﬁnancial markets of the target country, one could argue that more
developed ﬁnancial markets should also attract M&As. In the regressions, we do not ﬁnd that market
capitalization over GDP of the target countries matters, but it would be premature to conclude that
the development of ﬁnancial markets of target countries do not impact cross-border M&As. In the
regressions we control for source and target countries ﬁxed eﬀects (contrary to Di Giovanni (2005))
and given that the countries’ ﬁnancial depth changes smoothly across time, it is very likely that its
impact is captured by the ﬁxed-eﬀects. Indeed, we can show that the ﬁxed-eﬀects control for the
degree of ﬁnancial development across countries and changes over time of the market capitalization to
GDP ratio is more related to changes in the proﬁtability of investments of the acquiring country (as35
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Cross-border M&Aij,s,t in manufacturing






.506∗∗∗ .470∗∗∗ .557∗∗∗ .563∗∗∗






.229∗∗∗ .244∗∗∗ -.120 -.130






.469∗∗∗ .185∗ .157 .090






.729∗∗∗ .682∗∗∗ .269 .237
(.094) (.090) (.271) (.280)
Source country dummies no no no yes yes yes
Target country dummies no no no yes yes yes
Sectoral dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 76642 76071 74283 76642 76071 74283
Table 14: Gravity Models on Bilateral M&As at the sectoral level in manufacturing: The role of
ﬁnancial deepening and Tobin’s Q.
Estimation using Poisson-QMLE estimators. Country dummies of acquiring countries and target counties have
been excluded from columns (1) to (3). Time-dummies and sectoral dummies are always included. Standard
errors in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp. **
and ***). Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within country pairs.
Cross-border M&Aij,s,t in services






.562∗∗∗ .533∗∗∗ .535∗∗∗ .530∗∗∗






.515∗∗∗ .487∗∗∗ .110 .098






.330∗∗∗ .154 .181 .248






.532∗∗∗ .279∗∗ -.057 -.053
(.090) (.113) (.201) (.200)
Source country dummies no no no yes yes yes
Target country dummies no no no yes yes yes
Sectoral dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 83034 82872 80654 83034 82872 80654
Table 15: Gravity Models on Bilateral M&As at the sectoral level in services: The role of ﬁnancial
deepening and Tobin’s Q.
Estimation using Poisson-QMLE estimators. Country dummies of acquiring countries and target counties have
been excluded from columns (1) to (3). Time-dummies and sectoral dummies are always included. Standard
errors in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp. **
and ***). Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within country pairs.36
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in a standard Q-theory of investment).
We investigate this hypothesis by running the same regressions wit and without ﬁxed-eﬀects and
add two additional controls for ﬁnancial depth: domestic credit over GDP of source and target coun-
tries. Regressions in Tables 14 and 15 (see columns (1) to (3)) indicate that countries with deeper
ﬁnancial markets have a more intense M&A activity, both as buyers and sellers of ﬁnancial assets. This
holds for both measures of ﬁnancial depth as market capitalization and domestic credit of the host and
source countries are all statistically signiﬁcant for manufacturing as well as services. However, when
controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects, the only variable which remains statistically signiﬁcant is the acquiring
sector’s market capitalization to GDP ratio (Tables 14 and 15; columns (4) to (6)). We see these
regressions as very suggestive evidence that ﬁnancial deepening is an important driver of cross-border
M&As across countries (both for source and host countries) but this eﬀect cannot be identiﬁed across
time. Across time, only changes in expected proﬁtability of the acquiring sector (of a given country)
aﬀect signiﬁcantly cross-border M&As, supporting the Tobin’s q theory of investment.
5.4 Investigating the role of geography
We found very little impact of distance on cross-border M&As, which contradicts some previous
work where geography has usually been found to play a major role in shaping international ﬁnancial
transactions (Portes and Rey (2005), Georg, et al (2006), Head and Ries (2007)). We test two
competitive explanations for this result: ﬁrst, as already argued, the sample is mostly restricted to
developed markets and if distance proxies some information asymmetries, it is likely that information
costs are less related to distance for those countries. Second, a large share of M&A activities occurs
from 1995 onwards and it is possible that the improvement of information technologies worldwide
reduced information costs dramatically, making distance statistically insigniﬁcant.
We investigate the ﬁrst explanation by estimating whether geographical distance is a larger barrier
for M&As towards developing countries compared to M&As towards developed markets (see appendix,
section 7.2, for the classiﬁcation) by simply interacting the variable log(Distij) with a dummy which is
equal to one when the target country is a developed country. As shown in Table 16 (column (1) in the
case of manufacturing and column (3) in the case of services), distance matters more when the target
country is a developing country (the elasticity is around -0.5 for both manufacturing and services and
highly signiﬁcant), while the eﬀect of distance is negligible when the target country is a developed
market. This evidence supports the hypothesis that distance is essentially related to monitoring and
information costs for cross-border M&As.
We also investigate the second explanation by estimating the eﬀect of distance over time for both
developed and developing markets, by dividing the sample in two periods (before and after 1995).37
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M&As in manufacturing M&As in services
Distance elasticity when j is: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Developing Countries -.452∗∗∗ -.517∗∗∗
(.126) (.155)
before 1995 -.521∗∗∗ -.527∗∗∗
(.148) (.182)
after 1995 -.459∗∗∗ -.517∗∗∗
(.126) (.156)
Developed Countries -.026 -008
(.131) (.197)
before 1995 -.015 -.023
(.137) (.211)
after 1995 -.030 0.006
(.138) (.198)
Source country dummies yes yes yes yes
Target country dummies yes yes yes yes
Sectoral dummies yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Other controls yes yes yes yes
#Obs. 76642 76642 83034 83034
Table 16: Mergers and Acquisitions in manufacturing and services: The role of geography.
Estimation using Poisson-QMLE estimators. All controls of Table 1 - column (3), country dummies of acquiring
countries and target countries, time/sectoral dummies and sectoral are included but not reported. Statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust
standard errors.
While for developed markets, geography played no role over the whole period, the impact of distance
has decreased over time when the target is a developing country and the acquiring sector belongs to
manufacturing (see Table 16, column (2) and (4)), which is only somewhat consistent with the second
hypothesis of a decrease in informational costs over the period, as the change over time in the value
of the two elasticities is very small.
Distance is a major obstacle to cross-border M&As towards emerging markets while we found
its impact to be very weak on M&As among developed markets. This result suggests that distance
essentially proxies some information costs that are more predominant in developing countries.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the determinants of cross-border mergers and acquisition (M&As) over the
1985-2004 period in 10 manufacturing and 10 service sectors among the major economies of the world.
This exercise has been carried out by compiling a unique database using Thomson Financial. It
includes about three quarters of observations around the world and covers a broad spectrum of M&As.
Following the theoretical and empirical literature on the volume of M&As and FDI transactions and38
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using the gravity modelling approach, we study the role of: the EU single market, EMU, expected
proﬁtability, institutions, corporate taxation, product market regulations, ﬁnancial depth and physical
and cultural proximity.
The empirical results suggest that European integration and the improvement of the institutional
setting in the target country have positively inﬂuenced the world developments of cross-border M&As
of the manufacturing sector. We can safely argue that institutional changes acted as trigger factors of
capital reallocation of manufacturing across the globe.
The impact of the euro is very strong for M&As within the same sector (horizontal) in manufac-
turing. EMU almost tripled intra euro area cross-border horizontal M&As activity in manufacturing.
The estimated eﬀect on euro area M&As from non-euro to euro area countries amounts to a 70%
increase. The impact of the euro on vertical mergers in manufacturing sectors from non-euro to euro
area countries is also important (about 140%). Therefore, EMU had the eﬀect typical of unilateral
ﬁnancial liberalization and fostered the re-allocation of capital across ﬁrms by reducing marginal and
ﬁxed costs to undertake such transactions. The euro facilitated cross-border M&As within the euro
area, which aimed at restructuring capital within the same sector of activity, rather then boosting the
formation of conglomerate activities between sectors. These results are very indicative particularly
for countries which have recently joint the EU and EMU or might join in the near future. They
might attract sizeable foreign investment and gain from a more eﬃcient reallocation of manufacturing
capital.
Conversely, the impact on cross-border M&As in services of EU, EMU and institutions is not
statistically signiﬁcant pointing out that such activities may be aﬀected by the signiﬁcant barriers to
cross-border trade in services, which could have undermined M&As decisions of entrepreneurs. This
also implies that large structural changes will most likely occur as cross-border barriers are dismantled
in the service industry. We ﬁnd support for this hypothesis when testing the impact of product market
regulation on cross-border M&As. The level of protection and barriers to entry in the service sector
act as a strong deterrent to cross-border M&As in services across countries. The new directive on
services in the EU adopted in 2006 can help breaking such barriers allowing ﬁrms to ﬁnd the most
eﬃcient location for their investment in Europe, thereby triggering a new wave of cross border M&As
within the EU.
The empirical results of this paper provide support to the value enhancing motive of M&As, as
the acquiring sector’s stock market capitalization is an important explanatory variable of cross-border
M&As within the same sector as well as across sectors for both ﬁrm type in manufacturing and
services. As a rule of thumb, a 10% increase in the sectoral market value relative to its GDP rises
M&As of such sector by about 5%. The result that M&As respond to the acquiring sector’s stock39
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market capitalization explains why cross-border M&As come in waves and implies that they ought
to enhance economic eﬃciency in the home and target country, unless they are driven by an equity
bubble, managerial motives or strategic policy considerations which however do not boost proﬁts. It
could be pointed out that market capitalization over GDP is rather a proxy of ﬁnancial depth, as deep
liquid markets provide ﬁrms access to capital necessary to undertake investment projects which they
might otherwise have to forego. We argue that ﬁnancial depth is an important variable inﬂuencing
cross-border M&As, but it is a smooth process which cannot be easily identiﬁed across time; while -
even controlling for sectoral/country/time ﬁxed eﬀects - sectoral market capitalization over GDP of
the acquirer remains always statistically signiﬁcant. This implies that Tobin’s q theory of investment
is at work.
We also obtain interesting results on the role of corporate taxation and product market regulations,
which are informative for government policies. A 10 percentage point decrease in the diﬀerential in
corporate taxes between target and acquiring countries would increase the outﬂows of manufacturing
equity investment by 68%. The results also undisputable suggest that ﬁrms in manufacturing and
particularly in services prefer to expand in those countries characterized by a lower degree of product
market regulation, regardless of the public sector size in the target country. This implies that govern-
ment can act and be successful to attract foreign equity capital. This also raises the question of the
coordination of such policies within regional agreements.
Finally, as a by-side product, we reinvestigate the role of geography on cross-border M&As. Ge-
ography is measured using standard variables employed in gravity equations, such as geographical
distance and binary variables for common border and common language. We ﬁnd that proximity is of
importance to understand M&As activities. Indeed, there is considerable anecdotal evidence to sug-
gest that top management decisions are aﬀected by national culture. Strategic decisions and actions,
for example, may be inﬂuenced by diﬀerences of opportunism and trust in other societies (Angwin
(2001)). Cultural diﬀerences do play an important role in aﬀecting acquirers’ perceptions of target
companies and that this may have important consequences for the negotiation of cross-border M&As
deals. However, the impact of geography seems to be much more relevant for developing countries
than for developed markets.40
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7 Appendix
7.1 Trend in Cross-Border M&As and World Stock Market Value
Source: Thomson DataStream.
Figure 1: Cross-border M&As in all sectors (manufacturing and services) and stock market develop-
ments
Source: Thomson DataStream.
Figure 2: Cross-border M&As in manufacturing and stock market developments46
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Source: Thomson DataStream.
Figure 3: Cross-border M&As in services and stock market developments
7.2 Country List and Sectors
Source Countries (21)
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxemburg,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom, United States
Target Countries (31)
Developed Countries (20):
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Japan
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
Developing countries (11):
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, South Korea, Turkey47
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Manufacturing Sectors (10)
1 - Manufacture of Food, Beverages and Tobacco
2 - Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Industries
3 - Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products, Including Furniture
4 - Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing
5 - Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and Plastic Products
6 - Manufacture of Non-Metallic Mineral Products, except Products of Petroleum and Coal
7 - Basic Metal Industries & Fabricated Metal Products
8 -Machinery and Equipment
9 - Transport Equipment
10 - Other Manufacturing Industries
Service Sectors (10)
1 - Transport and Storage
2 - Communication
3 - Electric, Gas and Water Supply
4 - Education, Health, Social and Personal Service Activities
5 - Hotels and Restaurant
6 - Wholesale Trade
7 - Retail Trade
8 - Banking
9 - Insurance
10 - Other Financial Intermediation
7.3 Descriptive statistics
Data Source for cross-border M&As: Thomson Financial (SDC Platinum)
Sample:
- Annual data over the period 1985-2004
- 21 source countries and 31 target countries
- 10 manufacturing sectors and 10 service sectors
Aggregate M&As in manufacturing
Variable Mean Std Dev. Min Max N Non Zeroes
aggM&Aij,t (millions of USD) 117.71 1134.54 0 59838.63 13671 2605
aggM&Aij,t “within sectors” (millions of USD) 70.02 759.07 0 34440.55 13671 1809
aggM&Aij,t “across sectors” (millions of USD) 47.69 649.96 0 56426 13671 1664
Aggregate M&As in services
Variable Mean Std Dev. Min Max N Non Zeroes
aggM&Aij,t (millions of USD) 183.4 2366.9 0 210155.7 13671 2671
aggM&Aij,t “within sectors” (millions of USD) 107.63 2150.6 0 207185.2 13671 1716
aggM&Aij,t “across sectors” (millions of USD) 75.8 748.9 0 37268.2 13671 189248
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Sectoral M&As in manufacturing
Variable Mean Std Dev. Min Max N Non Zeroes
M&Aij,s,t (millions of USD) 11.221 289.17 0 54223 121200 4404
M&Aij,s,t “within sectors” (millions of USD) 7.224 215.98 0 32875.11 121200 2795
M&Aij,s,t “across sectors” (millions of USD) 3.997 182.905 0 53450.11 121200 2377
Sectoral M&As in services
Variable Mean Std Dev. Min Max N Non Zeroes
M&Aij,s,t (millions of USD) 21.83 759.00 0 206354.5 121200 5043
M&Aij,s,t “within sectors” (millions of USD) 12.95 722.26 0 206354.5 121200 2840
M&Aij,s,t “across sectors” (millions of USD) 8.88 220.61 0 34013.7 121200 3018
Explaining variables (country speciﬁc data)
Variable Mean Std Dev. Min Max N
log(Distij) 7.610 1.001 4.19 9.324 13671
Borderij .0614 .2401 0 1 13671
ComLangij .0368 .1884 0 1 13671
CivLibi,t 1.464 .7146 1 5 13020
CivLibi,t 1.840 1.168 1 7 12180
Eatrj,t − Eatri,t -.0015 .1044 -.4314 .4314 60069
Explaining variables (sector/country speciﬁc data)
Variable Mean Std Dev. Min Max N
log(GDPi,s,tGDPj,s,t) in manufacturing 11.849 4.375 -4.071 23.791 78490






(for manufacturing) -22.251 3.166 -35.472 -12.491 72207
Data Sources for explaining variables:
- Civil Liberties (CivLibi,t) are from Freedom House.
- Geographical variables, Common language dummies, trade data and aggregate GDPs are from
World Bank (Nicita and Olarreaga (2007)).
- Sectoral GDPs are from OECD Stan.
- Market capitalization data (aggregate and sectoral) are from Thomson Datastream.
- Corporate taxation data (Eatrj,t − Eatri,t) are from M. Devereux’s webpage.
- Regulation data are from Indicators of Product Market Regulation from OECD (see OECD
website). See descriptive statistics below on the sectoral index (Tables 16 and 17).
- Credit to GDP are from the World Bank Indicators.49
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Sector Mean Std Min Max
1 - Manufacture of Food, Beverages and Tobacco 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.18
2 - Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Industries 0.1 0.03 0.05 0.17
3 - Manufacture of Wood and ... 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.17
4 - Manufacture of Paper and ... 0.1 0.03 0.06 0.17
5 - Manufacture of Chemicals and ... 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.18
6 - Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.19
7 - Basic Metal Industries & ... 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.22
8 -Machinery and Equipment 0.1 0.03 0.06 0.17
9 - Transport Equipment 0.1 0.03 0.06 0.18
Manufacturing sectors 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.22
1 - Transport and Storage 0.36 0.14 0.16 0.7
2 - Communication 0.33 0.08 0.22 0.57
3 - Electric, Gas and Water Supply 0.4 0.17 0.17 0.9
5 - Hotels and Restaurant 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.14
6 7 - Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.38 0.12 0.19 0.59
8 9 10 - Financial services 0.31 0.07 0.17 0.45
Service sectors 0.31 0.15 0.05 0.9
All 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.9
Table 17: Descriptive statistics on Product Market Regulation by sectors, 1998-2003
All Manufact. Service
Country Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Mean Std
Austria 0.25 0.15 0.12 0.62 0.15 0.02 0.39 0.14
Belgium 0.21 0.14 0.08 0.51 0.12 0.01 0.34 0.13
Finland 0.18 0.13 0.07 0.49 0.09 0.01 0.31 0.13
France 0.25 0.18 0.09 0.74 0.14 0.01 0.41 0.19
Germany 0.19 0.1 0.1 0.45 0.12 0.01 0.29 0.1
Greece 0.25 0.19 0.07 0.69 0.14 0.04 0.43 0.2
Ireland 0.21 0.2 0.07 0.9 0.1 0.01 0.37 0.24
Italy 0.24 0.16 0.1 0.7 0.14 0.02 0.38 0.16
Netherlands 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.7 0.08 0.01 0.25 0.12
Portugal 0.23 0.14 0.08 0.61 0.14 0.01 0.36 0.14
Spain 0.2 0.12 0.07 0.59 0.13 0.01 0.3 0.14
Emu 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.9 0.11 0.03 0.31 0.15
Denmark 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.53 0.08 0.01 0.26 0.11
Sweden 0.14 0.1 0.05 0.4 0.07 0.01 0.24 0.09
United Kingdom 0.14 0.1 0.06 0.42 0.08 0.01 0.23 0.11
Eu 0.2 0.15 0.05 0.9 0.11 0.03 0.32 0.16
Canada 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.38 0.08 0.01 0.26 0.1
Japan 0.2 0.14 0.09 0.59 0.11 0.01 0.34 0.14
New Zealand 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.36 0.09 0.01 0.21 0.07
Norway 0.23 0.13 0.12 0.56 0.14 0.01 0.35 0.13
Switzerland 0.19 0.14 0.07 0.6 0.1 0.01 0.31 0.16
United States 0.14 0.1 0.06 0.35 0.08 0.01 0.23 0.09
All 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.9 0.11 0.03 0.31 0.15
Table 18: Descriptive statistics on Product Market Regulation by country (using the sectoral indica-
tor), 1998-200350
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